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Abstract 
 
We compare reported job satisfaction with vignette evaluations of hypothetical jobs by using 
a British, Greek and Dutch data set, containing 95 randomly assigned vignettes. In order to 
test comparability of international data sets recently the method of anchoring vignettes has 
been introduced by King et al. (2004). This intuitively and attractive idea requires the 
properties of vignette equivalence and response consistency. In our data set both job 
satisfaction and vignettes are numerically evaluated on a 0-10-scale. This fact allows us to 
interpret the evaluations as cardinal satisfaction values and to estimate satisfaction functions 
for vignettes and for the own job situation. We find that both functions differ significantly: 
vignette evaluations appear to depend on the own job situation and other individual 
characteristics. Hence, without correction for those differences in background characteristics, 
vignette evaluations are not comparable between individuals. Similar conclusions are reached 
for response consistency. We have to reject the properties of vignette equivalence and 
response consistency for each of the three separate countries considered and a fortiori for 
between- country comparisons. This finding puts into jeopardy the status of vignette 
evaluations as a substitute or an extension of reported job satisfaction. While vignette 
evaluations depend on working hours and wage, own job satisfaction also depends on softer 
variables such as type of contract, working times, and work organization. Since vignette 
analysis is frequently used in other fields like marketing and psychology, this finding may 
have a wider bearing than with respect to job evaluation only. However, the role of the 
vignette technique as an instrument to provide knowledge on ex ante individual preferences is 
not disputed.  
 
 
JEL-codes: J28, D6, J24, C25. 
 
Keywords: vignettes, vignette equivalence, response consistency, job satisfaction, subjective 
well-being.
1. Introduction. 
Job satisfaction is considered as an important issue in economics, and more specifically in 
labor economics and the fields of human resources, personnel economics etc (Freeman, 
1978). A large part of the research in job satisfaction is based on the use of a self-reported job 
satisfaction measure, derived from questionnaires in which respondents are asked to report 
how satisfied they are with their own job. The same tool of self-reported measures is used for 
other life domains, such as health, financial situation, and for measuring individuals‟ 
satisfaction with their life in general, that is, „life as a whole‟. An alternative tool to generate 
subjective evaluations is to present the respondents with a set of hypothetical situations that 
they have to evaluate. The hypothetical situations are known as vignettes. This methodology 
is extensively used in psychology and marketing (Green and Srinivasan, 1978 and Louvière 
et al. 2000) and more recently also in economics (Van Beek et al., 1997; Van Ophem et al., 
1999; Kapteyn et al., 2007; and Bago d‟Uva et al., 2010).  
 
In this study we focus on job satisfaction and we examine whether individuals evaluate 
satisfaction with their own job (job satisfaction) in a similar manner as they evaluate 
hypothetical jobs (vignettes). We assume that a job can be described by objectively 
measurable variables such as wage, hours worked, working conditions, and type of contract 
and that we are able to describe both the individual‟s current job and hypothetical jobs in 
those terms. We then examine the link between these job characteristics and both, individual 
current job satisfaction and the individual‟s evaluations of the vignettes defined with the use 
of those job characteristics.  In the earlier literature the response categories are described by 
means of verbal labels like „bad‟, „sufficient‟, and „good‟. In the more recent literature these 
verbal evaluations are usually replaced by numerical evaluations on a 1-7 scale or a 0-10-
scale. This transition from verbal to numerical responses is not immaterial. The verbal scale 
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may be seen as an ordinal ranking, where we do not know whether „the evaluation „good‟ has 
the same emotional connotation for respondent A as for respondent B. The numerical scale, 
on the contrary, may be seen as a cardinal evaluation by the respondent, although it is yet 
unknown whether a „7‟ has the same emotional connotation for respondent A as for 
respondent B.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature that uses vignettes to extract information about 
individuals‟ preferences and to correct answers on subjective questions for individual 
heterogeneity King et al. (2004) were the first to suggest „anchoring‟ vignettes as an 
additional tool to test whether satisfaction responses are comparable. They supplied different 
people with the same vignette and observed whether they evaluated it equally or differently. 
Kapteyn et al. (2007), Bago d‟Uva et al. (2009), and Voňková and Hullegie (2010), applied 
and tested the technique on its validity. 
 
The use of anchoring vignettes requires two main assumptions, namely vignette equivalence 
and response consistency. Response consistency means an individual evaluates his own job in 
a similar way as he evaluates hypothetical jobs, described by vignettes. Vignette equivalence 
implies that different respondents interpret and evaluate the vignettes similarly. 
 
Kapteyn et al. (2007), Bago d‟Uva et al. (2010), and Voňková and Hullegie (2010) applied 
and tested the anchoring vignette technique on its validity. Its usefulness as a substitute or as 
an extension of the subjective satisfaction questions clearly depends on whether the 
assumptions of vignette equivalence and response consistency are simultaneously satisfied. 
Kapteyn et al. (2007) and Bago d‟Úva et al. (2010) have looked into this problem and tested 
the validity of these assumptions with mixed results. 
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In this paper we test vignette equivalence and response consistency, using a European data set 
on job satisfaction. Besides adding a piece of evidence to the still scarce literature, this paper 
differs from previous literature in two main aspects. One, in the questionnaire individuals are 
asked to evaluate both their current job satisfaction and the vignettes not on the usual verbal 
scale with a few categories but on a numerical scale from 0 to 10, enabling us to assume a 
cardinal interpretation. This allows us to diverge from the chopit-model (e.g., Kapteyn et al., 
2007 and Kristensen and Johansson, 2008) that estimates the threshold values separately. 
Instead making use of the cardinal character of both properties to be tested, we use OLS-
estimations to test for equivalence and consistency. We allow the vignettes evaluations by the 
same individual to be correlated. Two, our data set includes a significantly larger number of 
vignettes than the other studies. We use 95 different vignettes of which varying 5-tuples are 
supplied to respondents. This means that we have much more variation than the typical study 
that includes 3 to 5 vignettes in total.  
 
The empirical results show that both assumptions (vignette equivalence and response 
consistency) do not hold in their simple form. However, the interpretative differences 
between respondents can be partly ascribed to heterogeneity for which correction terms may 
be devised. 
 
2. The theoretical model. 
In the present context the vignettes are used to describe hypothetical job scenarios. A typical 
vignette is presented in Figure 1. The vignette describes the job by means of a vector z of job 
characteristics, such as wage, type of contract, and working hours.  Respondents are asked to 
evaluate each vignette on a scale from zero to ten. The evaluation of the vignette is denoted 
by V(z) and we distinguish between individuals A and B by denoting VA(z) and VB(z) 
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respectively, where we admit for the possibility of individually different vignette evaluation 
functions. It seems intuitively plausible that respondents evaluate these fictitious jobs by 
relating them to their own actual job situations (zA and zB). Therefore, we assume a vignette 
evaluation function of the type VA=V(z; zA) and VB=V(z; zB). The variables zA and zB represent 
the current job characteristics that strictly relate to the vignette description. For example, the 
fact whether the individual works on Sundays or is member of a trade union organization is 
not included as part of the zA and zB, since these attributes are not part of the vignettes. In 
addition, it may well be that the vignette evaluation also depends on other individual 
characteristics x, such as age, education level, number of children, or job characteristics not 
included in the vignette, such as whether the individual works with computers or is a member 
of a trade union. In that case we describe the evaluation function as VA=V(z; zA, xA). If the 
vignette evaluation functions V(z) do indeed depend on zA, zB, xA , or xB, we can conclude that 
the individuals‟ evaluations are influenced by their different background conditions.  The 
causes of the differences in evaluation, however, are traceable; the evaluations can be 
corrected per respondent for different background conditions and be made comparable, as 
long as A and B have the same vignette evaluation function. If the functions VA(z) and VB(z)  
are different, e.g., they have different parameters, incomparability cannot be corrected as the 
individuals evaluate according to different evaluation schedules (or norms). In this case we 
need to reject vignette equivalence. If individuals do have the same vignette evaluation 
function V =V(z; zA, xA), the evaluation differences of a specific vignette between individuals 
may be  completely explained by differences in zA and xA. 
 
The second assumption, i.e., response consistency, can be tested as well. We assume a job 
satisfaction function ( ; )A AU z x . Individuals may be asked to evaluate a vignette that fits their 
own job situation. The vignette evaluation would then be ( ; , )A A AV z z x and this should be 
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identical (on the same 0 to 10-scale) to their job satisfaction (UA = ( ; )A AU z x ). Thus, response 
consistency holds if and only if ( ; , ) ( ; )A A A A AV z z x U z x . In this study the two evaluation 
functions V(.) and U(.) are estimated and compared, using data derived from the Epicurus 
Survey.  
 
3. The data  
The data set for this study was developed in the framework of the European EPICURUS- 
project from identical surveys carried out in various European countries between July and 
September 2004 among workers. In this paper we only utilize the data for Greece, the 
Netherlands, and the U.K.
1
. In the Netherlands and the UK, the survey was Internet-based, 
while in Greece, where the Internet penetration was rather low, face-to-face interviews were 
used instead and a protocol, identical to the Internet survey, was followed. There were 1000 
observations for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom each and (due to the larger costs) 
800 for Greece.  In order to guarantee a certain degree of sample homogeneity, the sample 
was restricted to employed individuals (excluding non-workers and self-employed) with low 
                                                 
1
 The survey took place in the framework of the EPICURUS- project. The main objective was 
obtaining more insight in the labor market conditions of European citizens and how these 
conditions affect their quality of life. Since the surveys for Greece, the Netherlands and the 
UK were implemented by the same company that guaranteed the use of identical protocols, 
only the data for these three countries are used here. The questionnaire was developed by 
Ioannis Theodossiou (project leader), Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Bernard M.S. Van Praag. 
Kristensen and Johansson (2008) use the complete data set, also including Denmark, Finland, 
France, and Spain for another study. The company responsible for the survey was Interview-
NSS (currently Synovate), a company with much experience on surveys in various countries. 
   
 8 
or middle education (i.e. excluding individuals with an education level 5 or 6 in the ISCED 
International Classification 1997), In addition, workers in the agriculture or fishery sectors 
were also excluded. The final sample is representative for the target sub-population group in 
each of the countries.  
 
A considerable part of the questionnaire was devoted to the respondents‟ evaluation of the 
vignettes.
2
 Figure 1 shows a simplified version of a vignette.  
 
Figure 1. Example of a vignette 
Imagine that, for some reason you had to stop with your current job and had to look for a new 
one. Imagine that after a short time you get several offers. We will list them on the following 
screen. These listed jobs offers do not differ from your current job except for some points we 
specifically mention.  
 
Can you please evaluate these offers on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst 
possible and 10 the best possible offer? And indicate if they are acceptable?” 
  
Wage: 20% more than now per hour 
Type of contract: Permanent with risk of losing the job with no severance pay 
Working hours: 20 hours a week  
Working times: Rotating shift system  
Training Opportunities: The employer will offer you a 10 workdays training program in the 
course of the year. 
Work organization: The job involves working in a varying team 
Work Conditions: No one controls your work 
Work Speed: The job is fairly demanding, which means that sometimes you may have to 
work at high speed 
Retirement: You can retire at age 55 
Behavioral norms: Same working conditions as in other firms No loyalty from both sides. 
Shirking and low performance is possible 
 
How would you rate this offer? 
 
Please evaluate this offer on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the worst possible and 10 
the best possible job. 
 
                                                 
2
 In Table 2.A we present the complete list with all the job attributes and the value ranges that 
they can take. These are available upon request. 
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The set of specific attributes chosen to be included in the vignettes is by no means an 
exhaustive characterization of a job, but it is sufficiently informative for the purpose and 
focus of this paper. Since a full characterization of a job is clearly impossible, the vignette 
description is completed by indicating to the respondent that all the aspects of the 
hypothetical job other than the dimensions explicitly mentioned in the vignette are identical 
to the respondent‟s own present working conditions. Each vignette is described by 10 job 
attributes, each of which can take various values. In Table 1A we give a complete list of all 
the attributes and its possible values. For example, the job attribute „type of contract‟ can take 
6 different values, varying from a permanent contract with no risk of being fired to a one-year 
contract with no probability of continuation. The reader will notice that in the vignettes wage 
is defined in terms of a relative deviation from the current wage of the respondent. This 
procedure eliminates the usual problems of wage definition and the problems that arise if 
respondents with widely different wages have to evaluate the same vignettes.  
 
Preliminary trials showed that five vignettes was the maximum number that could be 
presented to a respondent in an Internet survey in order to maintain a satisfactory response. In 
order to create more variation to estimate the individual‟s vignette evaluation function (VEF), 
we created a total sample of 95 different vignettes that were randomly divided into 19 sub-
sets of 5 vignettes each. Each set of 5 vignettes was randomly allocated over the respondents 
so that each respondent would only have to answer 5 vignettes, while in the meantime 
valuations of 95 hypothetical jobs would be collected. In order to eliminate possible ordering 
effects, the respondents were allowed to go backwards and forwards on the screen and see the 
vignettes several times.  An identical approach was followed in the face-to-face interviews.  
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In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to evaluate the vignettes on a 0 to 10 scale. The 
average rating for the vignettes was 4.12 and the evaluations varied over the whole offered 
scale (i.e.  0 to 10). The highest average rating is reported for Greece closely followed by the 
Netherlands.  
 
In line with the usual practice in the literature, the respondents were also asked to evaluate 
their own job satisfaction using a 0-10 point scale. The job satisfaction question was asked 
before the vignettes were supplied but after the respondents had already been asked a set of 
questions about their current job situation. The answer to this question is, in line with the 
literature, taken as a proxy measure for individual job satisfaction. In the sample, individual 
average job satisfaction was 6.843. The highest average job satisfaction was reported in the 
Netherlands (7.325) and the lowest in the U.K. (6.346).  
 
Finally, the questionnaire includes a wealth of details regarding the respondent‟s current 
socio-economic status and job situation. This information is used to explain the individuals‟ 
job satisfaction and their evaluation of vignettes. 
 
4. Estimation Methodology 
As both the vignette evaluation function and the job satisfaction function are bounded by the 
questioning mode between zero and ten, it is trivial to divide all answers by 10 in order that 
they vary between zero and one. The vignette evaluation function is now specified as a 
standard normal distribution function as follows: 
   
 0( ;0,1)A A AV N z z x          (1) 
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We denote the corresponding quantile by 1( )A Av N V
 . The equivalent relationship is: 
 
 0A A Av z z x          (2) 
 
Using (1) or (2), it is easy to see that vignette equivalence implies γ= o and = o, which is 
testable by estimation. If γ and/or  are non-zero, the vignette evaluation will depend on the 
respondent‟s situation. However, it is possible to control for the differences in (zA, xA) and on 
the basis of the estimated relationship (2) to predict the response of respondent A on a 
specific vignette if his job would have been Az  instead of Az  or when his characteristics were 
Ax  instead of Ax .  
 
Similarly to the vignettes case, the answers to the job satisfaction question can be 
transformed yielding the linear equation  
 
 ,0A u A u A uu z x       (3) 
 
If there is response consistency, then there must hold ( ; , ) ( ; )A A A A AV z z x U z x . Consequently 
the following (vector-) equalities should hold  
 
 
0 ,0
u
u
u
  
 
 
 


 (4) 
  
between the parameters in equations (2) and (3).  
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The estimation of these equations and the testing of the two assumptions rests on the implicit 
assumption that the numerical evaluations have the same emotional value in terms of job 
satisfaction or vignette evaluation for all respondents.  In other words, individual responses 
are interpersonal comparable. This does not mean that individuals are assumed to value the 
same situation similarly, but that they do feel equally satisfied when they report the same 
number. 
 
The econometric approach in this paper is based on linking the normal quantiles 0.1 0.2, ,...u u to 
the answers provided by the respondent to estimate vA in equation(2) and uA in equation(3). 
Applying a similar procedure for the outer extremes, the values 0.025 0.975 and u u  are assigned 
to the responses 0 and 10 respectively. The variable to be explained is observed with a 
rounding-off error, but this does not lead to inconsistent estimates.  
 
Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004 and 2008, chapter 2) empirically demonstrate that in 
applying OLS estimation after the above transformation, the coefficient estimates and their t- 
ratios are similar to those of the corresponding latent model in Probit, except for a common 
positive factor of multiplication. This implies that the trade-off ratios between variables are 
very similar as well, which is intuitively to be expected as both approaches boil down to 
estimating the same net of indifference curves. This method is one member of a group of 
similar methods, suggested by Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell that can be used as more 
flexible alternatives to Probit. Recently, these methods have also been applied by Luechinger 
(2009), Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), and Pischke (2010). 
 
Since each individual is asked to evaluate a set of five vignettes, we allow for correlation 
between the error terms of the five different vignette evaluations. Thus, we apply an 
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individual random effect and we decompose the error term in the vignette evaluation function 
as:  
 
 
.nj n nj     (5) 
 
where the first term is the individual random effect and the second is the usual white noise 
varying over the vignettes. Assuming that , one may apply 
the usual individual random effect model of panel analysis on the five vignette evaluation 
responses.  
 
5. Results 
In Table 1 we present the estimation results for the vignette (equation(2)) and for the job 
satisfaction (equation(3)) for each of the three countries separately. The first part of the table 
gives the coefficients β, corresponding to the variables z describing the vignette. The 
corresponding estimates do not exist for the job satisfaction equation. The second part gives 
the coefficients ( , u  ), which correspond to zA, the variables describing the characteristics of 
the current job that strictly relate to the attributes described in the vingettes. Finally, the third 
part gives the effects ( , u  ) of the non-job related variables or those job characteristics that 
are not included in the vignettes xA. 
 
5.1 Testing vignette equivalence and response consistency 
5.1.1 Vignette equivalence. 
Vignette equivalence means that individuals do not systematically differ in the way they 
understand the vignettes. In our empirical analysis, we estimate the three countries separately 
.( ) 0, ( ) 0, ( . ) 0n njE E E    
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and therefore we need to test whether (i) respondents in one country evaluate vignettes 
identically; and (ii) respondents in different countries evaluate vignettes identically.  
 
In order to respond to the first question (the within country aspect) we look at the statistical 
significance of the coefficients of parts 2 and 3 of Table 1 of the vignette equation columns. 
The variables describing the job situation that is linked to the vignettes (zA) (coefficients in 
part 2) have a very small statistical impact on the vignette evaluation and we see only a few 
statistically significant effects. Notably, Greek workers with different working time 
arrangements evaluate vignettes differently. However, on the whole nearly all coefficients do 
not differ statistically significantly from zero. With respect to the other coefficients (part 3, 
variables xA) we see that only the number of income earners in the household is statistically 
significant in Greece and UK. Therefore, and after correcting for those few differences, 
vignettes seem to be well-comparable within the three countries considered. 
 
With respect to the between-country differences in the evaluation of the vignettes the 
situation is less positive. The coefficients of those variables that describe the vignette 
attributes (part 1, z) mostly do not significantly differ among countries, but there are some 
statistically significant differences. The optimal number of working hours is at about 25 hours 
a week in the three countries. However, the sensitivity to differences in working hours is very 
high in the Netherlands, much less in the UK and by far the smallest in Greece. Although 
most of the coefficients describing the individual job characteristics included in the vignettes 
(part 2, zA) are not statistically significant, there are statistically significant differences 
between countries. For instance, in the UK the variable indicating that the worker currently 
works for a firm that offers early retirement possibilities at 55 has a negative effect on the 
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vignette evaluation. The current job characteristics that are not mentioned in the vignettes or 
the non-job characteristics (part 3, xA) do not differ dramatically between the countries.  
 
Table 1: Vignette and Job Satisfaction equations estimated. 
 Greece Netherlands U.K. 
Part 1 : (z) Vign.  JS  Vign.  JS  Vign.  JS  
             
Constant -6.476  2.143 ** -11.422 * -8.173  -3.409  -28.242 
*
* 
             
Variables describing the vignette  
Type of contract             
Perm. cont. with no risk 0.269 **  0.341 **   0.293 **  
Perm. cont. with risk but compensation 0.146 **  0.210 **   0.125 **  
Perm. cont. with risk & no compensation 0.089    0.114 **  -0.060    
Temp. cont. to perm. cont 0.091    0.248 **  0.241 **  
Temp. cont. to temp. cont 0.076 *   0.246 **  0.251 **  
(ref. Temp.cont. to unempl.)             
Ln(Working hours/week) 1.951 *   9.539 **  5.523 **  
Ln(working hours/week)^2 -0.304 *   -1.429 **  -0.843 **  
Wages (in % of own income) 1.276 **  1.006 **  1.420 **  
Working times             
Office working hours 0.014    0.100 **  0.126 **  
Working times decided by employee 0.010    0.051    0.111 **  
Rotating shifts -0.150 **  -0.107 **  -0.069 **  
(ref. working times decided by employer)             
Training  -0.012    -0.027 **  -0.039 **  
Work organization             
Job not in teamwork 0.028    -0.008    0.058 *   
Job in varying teamwork 0.037    0.000    0.083 **  
(ref. Job in fixed team)             
Control over own work             
Job has a fixed routine 0.023    -0.097 **  -0.075 **  
Can choose order tasks -0.028    0.062 *   0.068 **  
(ref. no one controls your work)             
Intensity due to high speed             
Often high speed -0.083 **  -0.203 **  -0.153 **  
Sometimes high speed -0.004    -0.092 **  -0.044    
(ref. never working at high speed)             
Intensity due to tight deadlines             
Often tight deadlines -0.052    -0.096    -0.145 **  
Sometimes tight deadlines -0.090 **  -0.044 **  -0.061 *   
(ref. never working with tight deadlines)             
Retirement             
Have to stop before 65 -0.025 **  0.128 **  0.061 **  
Early retirement 55 0.239 **  0.216 **  0.186 **  
Early retirement 60 0.160    0.221    0.208    
(ref. firm has no early retirement plans)             
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Continuation Table 1 
 Greece Netherlands U.K. 
Part 2 : (zA) Vign.  JS  Vign.  JS  Vign.  JS  
             
Variables describing respondent’s current job ,being also attributes of the vignettes 
Missing inform. Wage -0.588  1.143 ** -0.224  0.105  0.187  0.195  
Ln(monthly net wage)  -0.096  0.169 ** -0.036  0.018  0.046 * 0.014  
Type of contract             
Perm. cont. with no risk -0.060  0.258  -0.243  0.374 ** -0.070  0.377  
Perm. cont. with risk but compensation -0.054  0.221  -0.167  0.230  -0.038  0.214  
Perm. cont. with risk & no compensation -0.004  0.129  -0.141  0.104  -0.065  -0.022  
Temp. cont. to perm. cont 0.176  -0.245  -0.341  0.191  0.100  0.192  
Temp. cont. to temp. cont 0.115  0.047  -0.094  0.479 ** 0.096  0.390  
Other type of contract -0.045  0.092  -0.165  0.345 * -0.107  0.330  
(ref. Temp. cont. to unempl.)             
Ln(Working hours/week) -1.419  -2.629  -0.006  -0.161  -0.858 ** 0.073  
[Ln(Working hours/week)]2 0.217  0.360  0.015  0.029  0.141 ** -0.025  
Missing inform. on  working hours -2.189  -4.984 * 0.122  0.058  -1.268 ** -0.077  
Working times             
Office working hours 0.031  0.105  -0.030  0.037  0.029  -0.042  
Working times decided by employee 0.311 ** 0.493 ** -0.002  0.098 * 0.004  0.148  
Rotating shifts 0.159 ** 0.111  0.063  0.030  0.022  -0.106  
(ref. working times decided by employer)             
Training  0.030 * -0.014  -0.003  -0.033 ** -0.023 * -0.072 ** 
Work organization             
Job not in teamwork -0.126 * -0.221 ** 0.069  0.001  -0.035  -0.085  
Job in varying teamwork 0.061  -0.029  -0.034  -0.049  -0.025  -0.089  
(ref. Job in fixed team)             
Control over own work             
Job has a fixed routine -0.123  -0.219 * -0.038  -0.213 ** 0.014  -0.124  
Can choose order tasks -0.067  -0.173  -0.042  -0.059  -0.012  0.136  
(ref. no one controls your work)             
Intensity due to high speed             
High high speed -0.037  -0.058  -0.038  -0.129 ** 0.001  0.019  
Medium high speed 0.061  0.080  0.058  -0.061  0.053  0.012  
(ref. Low high speed)             
Intensity due to tight deadlines             
High tight deadlines 0.066  -0.060  0.050  -0.036  0.078 * 0.045  
Medium tight deadlines -0.031  -0.051  0.033  -0.036  -0.001  0.043  
(ref. Low tight deadlines)             
Retirement             
Early retirement 55 -0.009  0.113  -0.081  -0.304  -0.235 ** 0.172  
Early retirement 60 0.051  0.045  -0.016  0.030  0.008  -0.040  
(ref. retirement at 65)             
Missing information on retirement age -0.060  0.001  0.093  0.248  0.256 ** -0.178  
Have to stop before 65 -0.002  -0.087 * -0.061  -0.065  0.013  -0.191 ** 
Missing information on `have to stop´     0.050  -0.005  -0.015  -0.011  
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Continuation Table 1 
 Greece Netherlands U.K. 
Part 3 : (xA) Vign.  JS  Vign.  JS  Vign.  JS  
             
Respondent job (not included in the vignette) and non-job related characteristics 
Individual has lower education -0.029  0.003  0.057 ** 0.084 ** 0.045  0.123 ** 
Individual is a male 0.024  0.024  0.091  -0.015  0.043  -0.181 ** 
Ln(individual's age) 0.116  0.154  -0.561  0.710  -0.583  2.140  
Ln(individual's age)- Squared -0.013  -0.031  0.073  -0.082  0.052  -0.267  
Individual is married 0.035  -0.077  0.016  0.014  0.027  0.012  
Ln(# of earners in the household) 0.141 ** -0.032  -0.017  -0.054  0.126 ** 0.056  
Individual works in the public sector 0.007  0.127 * -0.045 * 0.039  -0.016  -0.158 * 
Ln((# children under 16)+1) 0.080 * 0.030  -0.085  0.054  -0.027  -0.003  
Missing information `children under 16´     0.012  -0.046  0.062  -0.004  
Individual has two jobs 0.196  -0.137  -0.014  -0.044  0.044  0.000  
Ln(#. weeks unemployment last year) -0.014  0.030  0.011  -0.003  0.007  -0.025  
Year of start current employer 0.003  0.001  -0.002  0.003  -0.002  0.012 ** 
Individual works on Sunday 0.046  -0.094  0.042  0.004  0.039  0.165 * 
Individual works nights 0.006  -0.011  -0.011  0.084  -0.010  -0.073  
Individual works with flexible times 0.051  -0.075  0.009  0.006  0.005  -0.026  
Individual works on clocking 0.054  -0.138 ** 0.064  0.012  -0.026  -0.100  
Individual works on call -0.009  0.095  0.043  0.062  0.021  0.096  
Individual works with computers -0.055  -0.013  -0.004  -0.069 * -0.046  -0.057  
Individual works with merit system 0.105  -0.069  -0.060  0.058  0.012  -0.074  
Individual does not work on location 0.172  -0.052  -0.015  0.037  -0.021  0.025  
Individual has career prespectives 0.072  -0.007  0.044 ** 0.097  0.052  0.168 ** 
Individual is member trade union -0.018  -0.073  -0.154  -0.069 * -0.069  -0.082  
Indiv. works with collective agreement -0.095 ** -0.038  -0.048  0.025  0.027  0.096  
Firm size: increasing -0.021  0.038 * -0.008  0.007  -0.007  -0.002  
Ln(#. minutes commuting each way) -0.004  0.007  0.028  -0.034 * -0.008  -0.026  
Desired retirement age 0.005  0.008 * 0.005  0.019 ** 0.003  0.012 ** 
Missing information on desired retirement -0.383  0.417  0.254  1.135 ** 0.137  0.652 ** 
Ln(#. times injured at work) 0.006  -0.027  0.114  -0.133  -0.102  0.024  
Ln(#. times sick due to work) 0.064  -0.084  -0.032 ** -0.014  0.033  -0.055  
Ln(desired working hours/week) 0.014  -0.030 ** 0.025  -0.024 ** -0.008  -0.032 ** 
Missing information `desired hours´     -0.056  -0.120 * -0.013  -0.050  
             
Number of Observations 3735  747  4330  865  4522  905  
Number of Groups 747    872    909    
R
2
:   0.1513    0.2073    0.1851  
                                                         within 0.3688    0.322    0.384    
between 0.1717    0.182    0.202    
overall 0.3055    0.273    0.329    
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% 
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Our overall conclusion with respect to the assumption of vignette equivalence is that vignette 
equivalence within countries seems acceptable after correction for some aspects of the 
respondent‟s job and life situation; between countries there are some important differences to 
the extent that some vignette attributes and some variables describing the current job situation 
show statistically significant differences among countries. 
 
5.1.2 Response Consistency  
Response consistency is tantamount to the assumption that respondents answer similarly 
when asked to evaluate hypothetical jobs as when they are asked to evaluate their current 
jobs. This is we need to test in how far equations (4) hold. A2 -test on the 51 equations 
simultaneously yields values of 195 for Greece, 781 for the UK, and 446 for the Netherlands. 
This means that in all cases the prob > chi2 = 0.0000 and we can reject the hypothesis of 
identity. When we pool all countries together the value of the 2 is 1405, which also implies 
rejection of the hypothesis of identity. Hence, the validity of (4) as a whole may be firmly 
rejected. It seems more informative however to differentiate response consistency per 
variable by testing each variable separately. Only if there is response consistency with respect 
to each separate variable, we can speak of overall response consistency. To test response 
consistency with respect to the job attributes describing the vignette (z), we need to combine 
the coefficients of z and zA in the vignette equation and to test them against the coefficients of 
zA in the job satisfaction equation. 
 
In Table 2A in the Appendix we report for each country whether the separate equalities in 
equation (4) have to be rejected (i.e, whether there is „no‟ response consistency) or cannot be 
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rejected (i.e., „yes‟, there is response consistency).3,4. We conclude that there are response 
inconsistencies especially with respect to working hours (except for Greece), for wage, and 
the importance of early retirement. The first two variables appear to be very dominant for 
determining the individual‟s choice between vignettes, but they are much less important for 
the evaluation of own job satisfaction. Table 2A shows that there are statistically significant 
differences between the way in which individuals evaluate their own job and the hypothetical 
jobs. This is an indication that there are two different concepts of job satisfaction: one 
schedule is applied to the own job, while another is applied for the evaluation of the 
hypothetical jobs described in the vignettes. Thus, we reject response consistency. 
 
                                                 
3
 Notice that due to the difference in definition in wage as a percentage deviation of own 
wage in the vignette description, for response consistency in wages we have to test the 
equation γ =γu. 
4 Due to lack of space, the values of the underlying t-test are not shown but they are available 
upon request. We took the correlation between estimates in the vignette equation into 
account. Given that the vignettes are randomly allotted to the respondents, the vignette 
characteristics and the individual‟s own job characteristics are independent of each other, that 
is, the two blocks of explanatory variables are orthogonal to each other. Consequently, the 
estimates of the effects of the vignette attributes on the vignette evaluation are not affected by 
inclusion or exclusion of the individual current job situation and other individual 
characteristics. In addition, there was almost zero correlation between the errors of the 
vignette equation and the satisfaction equation. Consequently, we assumed zero correlation 
between the estimates of the two equations. 
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This result casts doubt on the applicability of vignettes to predict satisfaction with real 
situations. Hence, one should probably make a sharp distinction between satisfaction derived 
from a real situation and the factors at play when evaluating between fictitious situations.  
 
The results suggest that there are different psychological mechanisms at work in performing 
evaluations of real situations and of vignettes. Our results indicate that in the hypothetical 
situation, where the details of the different alternatives are not well known, individuals are 
inclined to judge the different job situations on the basis of a few well-measurable and well-
visible characteristics only, such as wages and hours worked. These are ex ante preferences, 
which seem to differ from ex post preferences for situations that have been already 
experienced in reality. One can and probably should distinguish between two important 
concepts: (i) the own job satisfaction function that describes how individuals evaluate their 
actual job (experienced or ex post utility); (ii) the satisfaction function that depicts how 
individuals evaluate a job that they may not currently perform but of which they have a 
superficial schematic perception only (anticipated or ex ante utility). Job satisfaction, in 
contrast with ex ante utility, describes individual preferences after adaptation to current job 
circumstances (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999). It seems reasonable to assume that 
individuals base their job market decisions on  the „anticipated‟ or ex-ante  job utility5 
functions that differ from what individuals will actually experience when they are employed 
in the specific job (ex post utility). 
                                                 
5
 This concept is similar but not identical to the concept of „decision utility‟ proposed by 
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997). 
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5.2 Determinants of vignette evaluations and job satisfaction 
5.2.1 Vignette evaluations 
The results presented in Table 1 show that the offered hourly wage in the hypothetical job is a 
very strong factor explaining the preference for a vignette. The hourly wage is here expressed 
as a percentage of the respondent‟s wage in his or her present job. The effect of the (log)-
working hours on the vignette evaluation is statistically significant and it exhibits an inverted-
U shape relationship with an optimum number of working hours at about 25 to 28 hours a 
week depending on the country.  From this information one can derive the trade-off ratio 
between working hours and hourly wage that leaves the respondent at the same vignette 
utility level. The coefficients in Table 1 indicate that an increase from 38 to 39 working hours 
a week in a vignette would have to be compensated by a 7% increase of the percentage wage 
per hour in the UK
6
. For the Netherlands and Greece this number would be 17.25% and 
2.73%, respectively. Hence, one extra hour of work implies a premium compensation in the 
UK of about 39*7%274%, when the hourly wage for the first 38 hours is left unchanged. 
 
We can evaluate the other vignette attributes also in terms of compensating wages so as to 
evaluate the relative importance of the various job attributes included in the vignettes. For 
instance, the improvement corresponding to a change from a temporary contract with no 
possibility of renewal to a permanent contract with no likelihood of being made redundant 
appears to be equivalent in Greece to a wage reduction of 0.269 21%
1.276
 . It implies that the 
premium necessary to induce someone to accept the worst contract that appears in the 
vignettes instead of the best type of contract we included in the vignettes is about 21%. In 
                                                 
6
 The trade-off ratio for the UK is found by setting 5.523ln(working hours) – 
0.843ln(working hours)2 = 1.420(%wage). 
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other words, this is the disutility associated to this change of contracts. The estimated 
preference order indicates that, except in Greece, workers prefer temporary contracts with 
possibility of renewal to either a temporary contract or a permanent contract that involves risk 
of job termination. In Greece, a permanent contract with risk of termination but with 
compensation is preferred to all types of temporary contracts. This reflects the worker's 
aversion to uncertainty regarding their future labor market status, a preference in line with the 
literature indicating that temporary jobs are not desirable as a means of long-term careers 
(Booth et al. (2002)) and the well-documented distress associated with joblessness (Clark and 
Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998; Theodossiou, 1998). The working 
schedule appears to be a significant factor affecting the vignette preferences. Rotating shifts 
is seen to be the most undesirable working schedule while usual office hours are the most 
preferable working schedule. The organization of the work is an important determinant of 
vignette evaluation only in the UK, where individuals show a statistically significant 
preference for working in varying teams and a dislike for jobs with fixed routines. Similarly, 
respondents anticipate that some degree of job flexibility is preferable to fixed routine in the 
UK and the Netherlands. The working tempo is also relevant in the vignette evaluation: 
‟working under a tight deadline or at a high speed‟ has a clearly negative effect on the 
vignette evaluation and it is predicted to generate much less utility than „never working under 
such stressful conditions‟. Training opportunities are valued neither in the UK nor in the 
Netherlands: in these two countries, a job that offers opportunities for training has a 
significantly lower declared utility than jobs which do not offer such an opportunity. Finally, 
hypothetical jobs providing early retirement plans with no economic loss are seen as 
preferable compared to those that compel the worker to retire at 65 in all three countries. In 
this respect, it is interesting to notice that workers in UK and in the Netherlands appear to 
prefer a job “so physically demanding that they might be unable to perform it until the formal 
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retirement age of 65” to a job that does not provide early retirement plans. In contrast, this 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant for Greece. 
 
5.2.2 Job Satisfaction 
The job satisfaction equation includes the exact same set of variables as the vignette 
regressions in order to make the results comparable. As discussed in 5.1 some of the job 
characteristics appear to have a similar effect on both the vignette and the own job 
satisfaction, but many others do not.  
 
The dislike for uncertainty regarding the type of labor contact is not confirmed: workers in 
Greece and in the UK do not show any clear preference for a type of contract and in the 
Netherlands only some type of contracts are preferred to the worse type of contract, i.e. a 
temporary contract with no possibility of renewal. In contrast with the vignettes results, 
working hours are only statistically significant in the UK, although Greek employees show a 
clear preference for being able to choose their working times. Work organization does not 
have much effect on job satisfaction except for the negative effect in Greece of not working 
in teams of co-workers, while it did have an effect in the vignettes evaluation. The wage 
coefficient, which was statistically significant in the vignettes is only positive in Greece and, 
to a lesser extent in the UK. The effect of wages on Dutch job satisfaction is statistically not 
significant. Finally, whether the firm where the employee works has early retirement plans 
has no statistical impact on job satisfaction, although it is an important element of the 
vignette evaluation function.  Having a job that is physically so demanding that one needs to 
stop before 65, has a  negative effect and is statistically significant in Greece and UK. In the 
vignette evaluation this variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the 
Dutch and English respondents, and it is negative for the Greek respondents. 
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Training has a statistically negative effect on job satisfaction in the Netherlands and in the 
UK, as it has for the vignette evaluation in these two countries. There is a statistically 
negative effect of having a routine job in the job satisfaction of Greek and Dutch workers, as 
we found for the vignette evaluations of Dutch and UK workers.  
 
6. Conclusion. 
In this study we examined and compared the determinants of self-reported current job 
satisfaction and of workers evaluation of hypothetical jobs they do not perform. Our main 
conclusion is that there is no vignette equivalence; there are systematic differences (e.g., 
depending on the country of residence and on the workers‟ current working situation) in the 
way respondents value and interpret the hypothetical jobs described in the vignettes. In 
addition, we find no evidence of response consistency, i.e., individuals do not value in a 
similar manner their current job and a hypothetical job they do not perform. This empirical 
finding puts into jeopardy the status of vignette evaluations as a substitute or an extension of 
satisfaction evaluations of own jobs. This reduces the value of vignettes as an anchoring 
instrument. The divergence of the individuals‟ own job evaluations from their vignette 
evaluations is explained by utilizing the concepts of ex post and  ex ante satisfaction. Ex post 
or experienced satisfaction is reflected by job satisfaction questions, while vignette 
evaluations are steered by ex ante anticipated satisfaction. In evaluating the vignettes, it 
seems that respondents largely base their evaluations on hard measurable factors such as 
working hours and wage. Own job satisfaction depends also on softer variables like type of 
contract, working hours, working times, and work organization, which seem to be rather hard 
to visualize as being important deciding factors for evaluating fictitious jobs.  
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The major result of this study seems to be that we have to doubt the comparability between 
vignette results and the results of job satisfaction questions. This reduces the value of 
vignettes as an anchoring instrument. 
 
A major advantage of studying vignettes instead of real choice processes is that vignette 
evaluations (or observing the choice and/or ranking between vignettes) is not constrained by 
adaptation. In contrast, the evaluation of experienced situations is done after workers have 
adapted to their current job circumstances (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999).This study 
contributes to the growing literature on subjective well-being by proposing and 
operationalizing two different satisfaction or utility concepts, each of which adds to 
understanding human behavior regarding economic decisions. 
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Appendix 
Table 1A: List of attributes included in the vignettes and its possible values 
Variable Mean Min. Max 
Evaluation Vignette 4.120 0 10 
Type of contract    
Permanent contract with no risk of being fired 0,179 0 1 
Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with economic compensation  0,127 0 1 
Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with no economic compensation 0,180 0 1 
One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a permanent contract 0,239 0 1 
One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a temporary contract 0,157 0 1 
(reference: One-year contract with.no probability of continuation)    
Ln(Working hours)  (Working hours ranged from 20 to 50) 31.5 20 50 
    
Net wage per hour: expressed as a percentage of wages at current job. -0,020 -0,5 0,5 
Working times    
Flexible working hours 0,169 0 1 
Office working hours (you can choose which days your work) 0,283 0 1 
Rotating shifts (system) 0,315 0 1 
(reference: The employer decides about the working times (not in the night) and may change them monthly 
Training: 1= The employer will offer you a 3 months training program in the course of the year 
2= 1 month training, 3= 10 days training 4= 5 days training 5= 1 day training; 6= no training 
Therefore, the higher the value the variable takes, the less training the employee will receive. 3,433 1 6 
Work organization    
Job not in teamwork  0,307 0 1 
Job in varying teamwork 0,319 0 1 
(reference Job in fixed team)    
Control over own work    
Job has a fixed routine 0,397 0 1 
Can choose order tasks: job tasks are fixed, but you may decide when & how things are done 0,335 0 1 
(reference: No one controls your work)    
Intensity due to high speed    
Often high speed 0,243 0 1 
Sometimes high speed 0,158 0 1 
(reference: never working at high speed)    
Intensity due to tight deadlines    
Often tight deadlines 0,158 0 1 
Sometimes tight deadlines 0,169 0 1 
(reference: never working with tight deadlines)    
Retirement & Labour disability    
Have to stop before 65 (have to stop before 65 because the job is physically very demanding) 0,116 0 1 
Early retirement 55 (firm has early retirement plans) 0,199 0 1 
Early retirement 60 (firm has early retirement plans) 0,241 0 1 
(reference: the firm has no early retirement plans)    
Loyalty-no shirking: Loyalty from both sides; shirking & low performance impossible 0,570 0 1 
Dummy variables for countries: Netherlands, UK, and Greece    
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Table 2A: Consistency between vignettes and job satisfaction 
(based on results from Table 1) 
 Is there response consistency? 
 Gr NL UK 
Variables describing the vignette & the respondent current job situation related 
to the vignettes 
Wages No No No 
Type of contract    
Perm. cont. with no risk Yes Yes Yes 
Perm. cont. with risk but compensation Yes Yes Yes 
Perm. cont. with risk & no compensation Yes Yes Yes 
Temp. cont. to perm. Cont Yes Yes Yes 
Temp. cont. to temp. cont Yes Yes Yes 
(ref. Temp.cont.to unempl.)    
Ln(Working hours/week) Yes No No 
Ln(working hours/week)^2 Yes No No 
Working times    
Office working hours Yes Yes No 
Working times decided by employee Yes Yes Yes 
Rotating shifts Yes Yes Yes 
(ref. work. times decided by employer)    
Training  Yes Yes Yes 
Work organization    
Job not in teamwork Yes Yes Yes 
Job in varying teamwork Yes Yes No 
(ref. Job in fixed team)    
Control over own work    
Job has a fixed routine Yes Yes Yes 
Can choose order tasks Yes Yes Yes 
(ref. no one controls your work)    
Intensity due to high speed    
Often high speed Yes No No 
Sometimes high speed Yes Yes Yes 
(ref. never working at high speed)    
Intensity due to tight deadlines    
Often tight deadlines Yes Yes Yes 
Sometimes tight deadlines Yes Yes Yes 
(ref. never working with tight deadlines)    
Retirement    
Early retirement 55 Yes No Yes 
Early retirement 60 No No No 
(ref. retirement at 65)    
Have to stop before 65 Yes No No 
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Continuation Table 2A: Is there response consistency? 
 
Respondent job and non-job related characteristics 
Individual has lower education Yes Yes Yes 
Individual is a male Yes No No 
Ln(individual's age) Yes Yes Yes 
Ln(individual's age)- Squared Yes Yes Yes 
Individual is married No Yes Yes 
Ln(#. earners in household) No Yes Yes 
Individual works in public sector No Yes Yes 
Ln(# children under 16+1) Yes No Yes 
Missing infor. `children under 16´ Yes Yes Yes 
Individual has two jobs No Yes Yes 
Ln(#. weeks unempl. last year) No Yes Yes 
Year of start current employer Yes No No 
Indiv. works on Sunday No Yes Yes 
Indiv. works nights Yes Yes Yes 
Indiv. works with flexible times Yes Yes Yes 
Indiv. works on clocking No Yes Yes 
Indiv. works on call Yes Yes Yes 
Indiv. works with computers Yes Yes Yes 
Indiv. works with merit system Yes Yes Yes 
Indiv. does not work on location Yes Yes Yes 
Indiv. Has career prespectives Yes Yes No 
Indiv. Is member trade union Yes No Yes 
Ind. works w collective agreement Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size: in increasing No Yes Yes 
Ln(mint. commuting each way) Yes No Yes 
Desired retirement age Yes No No 
Missg. infor. `desired retirment‟ No No No 
Ln(#. times injured at work) Yes No Yes 
Ln(#. times sick due to work) Yes Yes Yes 
Ln(desired working hours/week) No No Yes 
Missg. infor. `desired hours´  Yes Yes 
 
  
